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The excessively optimistic assessment of market liquidity, i.e. the belief that transactions can be settled at 
current prices without any notable delays or transaction costs, may be a serious threat to ﬁ  nancial stability 
–the near failure of the LTCM hedge fund in 1998 was a case in point. Admittedly, the ﬁ  nancial community 
today appears to have a better grasp of the risks arising from liquidity illusion. The fact nonetheless remains 
that current risk management tools, particularly the most common Value at Risk (VaR) measures, do not 
capture this complex component of market risk satisfactorily. In fact, standard VaR calculations do not take 
speciﬁ  c account of the risk to which a portfolio is exposed at the time it is liquidated.
This article aims to explore the different aspects of liquidity risk and provide signposts to methods for 
incorporating this risk into existing risk control tools. We ﬁ  rst examine “normal” or average liquidity risk, which 
corresponds to the costs of liquidating or hedging a position in tranquil periods, then illiquidity risk that arises 
in crisis periods and results in the market’s inability to absorb order ﬂ  ows without violent price adjustments. 
Two separate methodologies, which must nonetheless be combined in a comprehensive approach, are 
required to analyse these two situations. In the ﬁ  rst case we seek to assess the frictions that emerge in 
imperfect markets by using bid-ask spread measures and by analysing the negative impact on prices 
resulting from the liquidation of a sizeable portfolio. In the case of extreme risk, we assess the potential 
consequences of occurrences that are rare, fundamentally uncertain and systemically important.
In each case, we suggest and describe a number of techniques that aim to incorporate these elements into 
the risk measurement and management systems used by private market participants, while underscoring 
the obstacles to application given the frequent unavailability of the data required. We show that these 
techniques are relevant because they provide a more cautious and more realistic assessment of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions’ exposure to risk.
Lastly, it is in market participants’ own interest for central banks and supervisory bodies to have at their 
disposal the information required to construct indicators for monitoring market liquidity or conducting 
sufﬁ  ciently comprehensive stress tests in order to assess the ﬁ  nancial system’s resilience to liquidity shocks, 
while taking into account all the externalities that market participants do not individually consider.ARTICLES
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T
he increased marketability of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments and transferability of risks 
has been one of the major features of the 
modernisation of ﬁ  nancial systems over the last 
twenty years. Bank balance sheets have been 
transformed for both assets and liabilities, with 
traditional bank intermediation being supplanted 
by market operations. Structured ﬁ  nance  and 
collateralised transactions have developed rapidly, 
as have methods for making credit risk marketable. 
In the current ﬁ  nancial environment, a considerable 
part of balance sheet management and structured 
ﬁ  nancing is thus founded on the assumption that 
markets for underlying assets will regularly fulﬁ  l
their transfer function, thanks to the constant 
presence of counterparties. However, market 
liquidity, i.e. the ability to settle transactions at 
current prices and at all times with no notable 
transaction costs, is never totally ensured. In 
fact, one of the most pernicious threats to market 
liquidity is the very illusion of its continuity.
This illusion means that market participants 
overestimate their ability to unwind transactions or 
hedge their positions smoothly and rapidly to meet 
requirements in unforeseen circumstances, which 
could lead them to take excessive risks ex ante.
Market liquidity is at the heart of central  banks’ 
ﬁ   nancial stability concerns because it is a 
precondition for market efﬁ   ciency and also 
because its sudden disappearance from markets 
may degenerate into a systemic crisis, as evidenced 
by the turbulence of summer and autumn 1998, 
which resulted in the abrupt drying up of liquidity 
on the bond markets. 
An extensive body of the literature dealing with 
the microstructure of ﬁ   nancial markets has 
been devoted to identifying the determinants 
of liquidity and modelling liquidity. Similarly, 
numerous studies on ﬁ  nancial crises show that
the shortage of liquidity is an element that is
always present in times of major crises (currency 
crises, banking crises, bursting of speculative 
bubbles, payment system gridlock, etc.). However 
this risk, a component of market risk that is difﬁ  cult 
to capture, is still not sufﬁ  ciently accounted for 
in risk measurement and management tools. 
This could be harmful because it is precisely the 
failure of internal control systems that has often 
been the culprit in past episodes of ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil such as the virtual collapse of the LTCM 
hedge fund in 1998.1
The purpose of this article is to present a number 
of techniques that aim to assess the risks incurred 
in the event of a decline in market liquidity and 
to examine to what extent these techniques may 
contribute to improving risk control in ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and also help the relevant authorities 
to enhance their analyses and assessments of 
ﬁ  nancial stability. We will examine beforehand the 
exact nature of market liquidity and the causes of 
its imperfection and chronic inconstancy.
1|  NATURE OF MARKET LIQUIDITY
  AND RISK OF ILLIQUIDITY
1|1  Imperfect market liquidity
  and the importance
  of transaction costs
Liquidity may be deﬁ  ned as a range of characteristics 
rather than a one-dimensional attribute of assets 
and of the markets on which they are traded. It 
is also a relative concept, as the more liquid the 
asset, the more it is easily traded for liquidity
“par excellence”: money, i.e. at low cost, at short 
notice and with no risk of a notable change in price.
A perfectly liquid market would therefore guarantee 
a single bid/ask price at all times and irrespective 
of the quantities being traded. Financial markets, 
even those deemed the most liquid, conform 
less than perfectly to this ideal conﬁ  guration. 
Liquidity risk is therefore the risk of not being 
able to immediately liquidate or hedge a position 
at current market prices. This market liquidity 
risk is different from balance sheet liquidity risk,
which is the inability to raise liquid funds by 
ofﬂ  oading assets or borrowing. It results from the 
fact that markets are not perfect at all times and in 
all segments (atomicity of participants, free entry 
1  See CGFS (1999), Jorion (P.) (2000).ARTICLES
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and exit at no cost, transparent information). The 
degree of liquidity of a market is traditionally 
assessed on the basis of three essential criteria:
• the tightness of the bid-ask spread, which measures 
the cost of a reversal of position at short notice for 
a standard amount,
• market depth, which corresponds to the volume 
of transactions that may be immediately executed 
without slippage of best limit prices,
• market resilience, i.e. the speed with which prices 
revert to their equilibrium level following a random 
shock in the transaction ﬂ  ow. 
The ﬁ  rst aspect is a direct measure of transaction 
costs (excluding other operational costs such as 
brokerage commissions and clearing and settlement 
fees). The last two indicate the market’s ability to 
absorb signiﬁ  cant volumes without adverse effects 
on prices. The rest of the article will focus mainly 
on market breadth and depth insofar as it will pay 
more attention to the costs of immediacy than to 
how long it takes prices to return to equilibrium 
(see Chart 1).
The bid price is the highest price that the market 
maker is willing to pay at a given time to acquire 
a speciﬁ  c amount of assets. Symmetrically, the 
ask price is the lowest price at which the market 
maker is willing to sell a given amount of assets. 
The gap between the bid price and the ask price 
(the bid-ask spread) compensates the market maker 
for the immediacy of execution that it offers to its 
counterparties. The spread measures the cost of a 
sell/buy or buy/sell sequence over a short period 
(two-way transaction); only the half-spread should 
therefore be attributed to a single transaction (sale or 
purchase) if one considers that the mid-price is the 
one that should be paid in a perfectly liquid market. 
The tightness of the spread depends, inter alia, on the 
costs of processing orders from market makers, the 
size and volatility of accumulated order ﬂ  ows as well 
as the degree of information asymmetry between 
market makers and initiators of transactions (the 
market maker is exposed to the risk of dealing with 
investors that have private information regarding 
the real value of the asset). In a quote-driven market, 
the quoted spread2 corresponds to the difference 
between the best bid price and the best ask price 
offered by market makers, whilst in an order-
driven market, what is important is the difference 
between the best limit order book prices.3 However, 
the spread quoted in the markets is not generally 
an exact reﬂ   ection of transaction costs (for a
buy/sell sequence) because certain transactions 
may be traded not at the bid or the ask price but at 
prices located within this spread, or even outside 
this spread, even for standard amounts.4 In addition, 
the spread is a measure of the liquidity available 
at a given time. With a view to risk measurement 
and management, it is therefore important to take 
account of its variability over time.
In particular, the spread is quoted for limited 
amounts and it normally tends to widen in the 
presence of massive order ﬂ  ows, which is what the 
concept of depth refers to. In the case of a sale, 
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Note : The bid price Bp and the ask price Ap are deﬁ  ned for the 
standard amounts OA and OA’. The Bp-Ap spread represents the 
“breadth” of the market. The amounts OA and OA’ are those that 
may be traded without price slippage: they reﬂ  ect market “depth”. 
Beyond points A and A’, one sees the negative impact of large-value 
transactions on the execution price. Resilience refers to the time aspect 
of liquidity and indicates how quickly prices adjust to their equilibrium 
value following a shock in transaction ﬂ  ow.
2  In general, the quoted spread is expressed as a ratio of the mid-price. It is then called the relative (quoted) spread.
3  These two types of market organisation differ with respect to the price setting methods and the way in which liquidity is ensured. On an order-driven market, 
liquidity is created by matching orders in a central order book. On a price-driven market, liquidity is created through the actions of intermediaries (market makers) 
who guarantee investors a bid price and an ask price for a minimum amount.
4  One may therefore calculate the relative effective spread, corresponding to the absolute difference between the price at which a transaction was performed and 
the midpoint (the difference is expressed as a ratio of the midpoint).ARTICLES
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5  This phenomenon was highlighted and illustrated by Akerlof in 1970 for the second-hand car market. In the same vein, Genotte and Leland (1990) consider the 
1987 stock market crash to be a result of problems of information asymmetry between market participants. 
6  This conventional econometric speciﬁ  cation postulates the stationarity of ∆Pt and NVOLt or the existence of a cointegration relation between these variables.
7  The latter may be calculated as the difference between the value of unexecuted orders at date t and that corresponding to the actual liquidation date T (based on 
the mid-price at T), see Perold (1988).
the negative impact of order ﬂ  ows on the bid price
comes from the decline in the market aggregate 
demand curve depending on the amounts offered, 
i.e. its imperfect elasticity. The latter may be 
attributed, in particular, to the information 
asymmetry between market participants. A 
substantial ﬂ  ow of sell orders for an asset is in
fact likely to arouse the suspicion that initiators of 
transactions have privileged information on the 
quality of this asset, and lead potential buyers to 
demand a price discount in exchange (the drop in 
the price may in fact lead to the total disappearance 
of the market5). Execution risk, i.e. the possibility 
of errors and delays in the settlement of large-value 
orders, may also prompt such market reactions. 
Price sensitivity to block transactions is often 
estimated using Kyle’s λ (1985) in the following 
econometric equation:6
  ∆ Pt = α + λ NVOLt + εt (1)
where price changes ∆Pt are a linear function 
of the net volume of trades (NVOLt: difference 
between the amount of buy orders and
sell orders in period t), with εt representing a 
random error. The λ  coefﬁ   cient assesses the 
market’s ability to absorb large-value transactions: 
the higher the value, the smaller the market’s 
absorption capacity.
Ultimately, to realistically assess portfolios’ risk 
exposure it is necessary to take into account the 
transaction costs incurred during liquidation. 
Transaction costs cover the costs of resorting to 
the market for the allocation of resources and 
transfer of property rights, i.e. the execution 
costs referred to above (spread, impact on prices
and other operational costs), and also the
possible opportunity cost if transactions have 
had to be deferred (forced relinquishment of the 
beneﬁ  ts of immediacy).7
These liquidation costs are relatively predictable 
in tranquil periods: the corresponding risk 
appears to be fairly manageable at these times.
Nevertheless, tranquil periods may mask the 
development of ﬁ   nancial vulnerabilities and 
liquidity is a fragile feature of markets. Therefore, 
liquidation costs are much less predictable in the 
presence of market stress.
1|2  Fragility of liquidity:
  co-ordination problems and crises
Market liquidity depends essentially on the 
presence of a sufﬁ  cient number of counterparties 
and their willingness to trade. The latter 
depends on investors’ expectations regarding 
price developments and also their risk aversion 
at a given time, as well as the information 
available (e.g. on issuers’ creditworthiness).
A “good equilibrium” of regular liquidity therefore 
presupposes heterogeneous expectations and 
behaviour, ensuring the execution of orders 
irrespective of the transaction direction.  Some 
analysts thus emphasise the contribution highly 
leveraged institutions operating under few 
regulations make to market making and liquidity. 
Similarly, it is rightly believed that liquidity is 
cumulative in nature and that, for example, 
the opening up of markets to new participants 
is likely to strengthen the positive externalities 
produced by a broader investor base. However, 
this must not lead us to ignore the precariousness 
of the collective valuation that –at any given 
time– characterises ﬁ  nancial markets and even 
those that are deemed the most robust, for it is 
subject to sudden swings in opinion.
The perception of guaranteed liquidity has in the 
past therefore led a number of ﬁ  nancial players 
to take excessively risky positions. C. Borio (2004) 
shows, in an anatomy of ﬁ  nancial crises, that these 
crises are typically preceded by phases of excessive 
conﬁ  dence in which risk exposure is heightened, 
fuelled by leverage. A hint of doubt creeping into 
market operators’ minds is all it then takes to 
radically change the market conﬁ  guration  and 
trigger a liquidity crisis.
Liquidity crisis is illiquidity risk that has reached its 
paroxysm. It may be deﬁ  ned as the market’s inability ARTICLES
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8  “Perps” were perpetual notes, whose coupons were linked to an interest rate reference (usually the Libor) and periodically redeﬁ  ned (every three months or every 
six months). Created in 1984, Perps were very popular, especially because the authorities allowed banks that issued them to include them in their regulatory capital 
under certain conditions and also because they enjoyed tax beneﬁ  ts. With higher yields than those offered on the interbank market, Perps attracted a large number 
of investors, in particular Japanese banks. In December 1986, there was a sudden drop in Perps prices. According to Fernando and Herring (2003), rumours and 
concerns surrounding a possible change in the Perps accounting regime were sufﬁ  cient to precipitate the collapse of this market.
9  See Diamond (D.), Dybvig (P.) (1983).
10  See Bernardo (A.), Welch (I.) (2004).
11  See Brunnermeier and Perdersen (2005).
12  See Cohen and Shin (2003).
to absorb order ﬂ  ows without provoking violent 
price adjustments that are unrelated to fundamental 
value. It is characterised by the sudden widening of 
the bid-ask spread, or even the total disappearance of 
buy (or sell) ﬂ  ows and the inability to trade. It often 
leads to an increase in short-term volatility as well 
as the slump of the primary markets. It therefore 
contains the seeds of serious systemic upheaval. 
The risk of having to face this type of event is that 
of booking major losses insofar as it is necessary to 
unwind positions in order to settle liabilities or meet 
hedging requirements.
This risk is difﬁ  cult to capture because it refers back 
to the paradoxical nature of liquidity clearly outlined 
by Keynes in 1936: the liquidity of a ﬁ  nancial asset 
simply does not exist for the ﬁ  nancial community 
as a whole. In other words, an asset can only 
remain liquid if its liquidity is not put to the test 
by all investors simultaneously. The drying up of 
liquidity is in fact the consequence of the unanimous
co-ordination of market players at a “bad
equilibrium”, with all players wishing to exit the 
market at the same time. Obviously, this type 
of occurrence can hardly be forecast: it may be 
triggered by a simple swing in the collective opinion, 
as shown, for instance, by the collapse, and then 
virtual disappearance of the Perps (Perpetual
ﬂ  oating-rate notes) market in 1987.8 In addition, 
the collapse of liquidity generates incentives that 
rationally induce economic agents to behave in 
ways that worsen the market situation as a whole. 
This negative chain of events is amply described in 
the literature on banking crises leading to rushes 
on bank deposits.9 It occurs in exactly the same 
way in market crises involving ﬂ  ights to liquidity. 
It is rational to try to act ﬁ  rst, i.e. to seek to exit as 
soon as distrust sets in, even if this behaviour only 
serves to speed up the evaporation of liquidity:10 
when it spreads, the fear of being short of liquidity 
is self-fulﬁ   lling. Naturally, a large ﬁ  nancial
institution (such as the main market makers 
on certain highly concentrated OTC derivative 
markets) may paralyse the market by pulling out. 
The difﬁ  culties faced by smaller but very active and 
highly leveraged participants, such as hedge funds 
(which may account for one-third or even half of 
daily transactions on the New York Stock Exchange 
and the London Stock Exchange) may cause the same 
types of problems. When they liquidate their assets 
in times of ﬁ  nancial distress, their actions are likely 
to alarm other market participants and thus trigger 
“predatory trading”,11  i.e. selling in anticipation, 
which withdraws liquidity instead of providing it at 
the appropriate time.
Ultimately, liquidity crises reﬂ  ect the dysfunction 
in the price regulation mechanism: instead of 
restoring the balance, price movements exacerbate 
pro-cyclical behaviour.12
Extreme liquidity risk is not a sum of minor 
independent risks, but rather systemic risk that 
leads to a major break in the usual statistical 
relationships between risk factors. It is, admittedly, 
a rare risk, but one that is inherent to liberalised 
ﬁ   nancial systems where phases of excessive 
optimism alternate with sharp market decline. More 
generally, successive ﬁ  nancial innovations reveal 
an increase in the revocability and conditionality 
of commitments to meet investors’ demand for 
marketability-liquidity. While they serve to increase 
microeconomic efﬁ   ciency, these facilities for 
pulling out of commitments –notional in times of 
stress– may give rise to the sometimes pathological 
spread of the preference for liquidity. With such 
speciﬁ  c risks, preventive measures rather than 
risky forecasts must be encouraged. Improving risk 
assessment tools is one essential aspect.
2| INCORPORATING
  LIQUIDITY RISK
  INTO RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Value at Risk (VaR) is an estimate of the maximum 
potential loss that may be incurred on a position 
at a given time horizon and level of conﬁ  dence. 
Though in recent years it has become a reference ARTICLES
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13  This distinction is made by Bangia et al. (1999).
14  See Lévy-Rueff (G.), (2005).
for market risk management —and this is why 
we are focusing on it in this chapter— the VaR 
model does not satisfactorily capture liquidity 
risk, which is an integral component of market 
risk. In calculating VaR, it is assumed that 
the positions concerned can be liquidated or 
hedged within a ﬁ  xed and fairly short timeframe
(in general one day or ten days), that the liquidation 
of positions will have no impact on the market 
and that the bid-ask spread will remain stable 
irrespective of the size of the position. The price 
referred to is often the mid-price or the last known 
market price. However, as we have seen, the quoted 
market price cannot be used as a basis for valuating 
a portfolio that is to be sold on a less than perfectly 
liquid market: in practice, account must be taken 
of its orderly liquidation value or even its distress 
liquidation value. The standard VaR model is not a 
reliable guide because it neglects the risk to which 
a portfolio is exposed during its liquidation.
It is nonetheless possible to adjust VaR measures 
so as to incorporate trading execution costs into 
risk assessment. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will examine the liquidity of a single asset, as the 
measurement of the liquidity risk of a portfolio of 
assets leads us to non-speciﬁ  c considerations on the 
correlation of risk factors. 
There are indeed ad hoc techniques for re-evaluating 
VaR by artiﬁ   cially increasing the volatility of 
positions deemed illiquid, or by lengthening the 
time horizon used for calculating VaR. However, 
because they propose arbitrary adjustments, these 
techniques do not deal directly with the issue of 
liquidity. The principle of adjustments that we 
present here consists essentially in re-calculating 
the distribution of asset returns by using not the 
market value but the liquidation value in “normal” 
times or in times of stress. 
2|1  Taking “normal” liquidity risk
 into  account
“Normal” liquidity risk is a relatively foreseeable 
average risk. It includes an “exogenous” component 
that corresponds to the average transaction costs set 
by the market and an “endogenous” component13 
that corresponds to the impact on prices of the 
liquidation of a position in an excessively tight 
market and that therefore applies to orders that 
are large enough to move market prices. The ﬁ  rst 
component may be incorporated in an adjusted VaR 
model by using various bid-ask spread measures, 
while endogenous liquidity risk may be factored 
in by using measures of the elasticity of prices to 
volumes (impact measures). 
USING BID-ASK SPREAD MEASURES
The value realised from reselling assets is generally 
not equivalent to their theoretical market price 
because a liquidity cost, which is represented by the
half-spread, puts a strain on the sales price.
It is therefore expedient, when examining historical 
bid-ask price series, to estimate the (exogenous) 
liquidity cost that may affect the market value 
of a position. A simple method would consist in 
adding the observed average of the half-spread to 
conventional VaR. This method does not however 
take account of the variability of the half-spread 
over time. This is why it would be wiser to try to 
extract from historical data series information on 
the statistical distribution of bid-ask prices, and in 
particular on their volatility.
Standard VaR calculations presuppose using a 
distribution of returns. The distribution may 
be determined using three types of methods 
(parametric, historical simulation or Monte Carlo 
simulation).14 The same approaches may be
applied to the distribution of bid-ask spreads
with the aim of calculating the most unfavourable 
half-spread for a given time horizon and conﬁ  dence 
threshold.The highest exogenous liquidity cost 
is thus obtained. It is added to the standard VaR
deﬁ  ned for the same time horizon and the same 
conﬁ  dence threshold.
Assessing the overall risk of an asset by simply 
summing up its price risk –which is reﬂ  ected 
by the standard VaR model– and the exogenous 
liquidity cost amounts to assuming that these 
two components are perfectly correlated (i.e. that 
high variability of the mid-price is associated with ARTICLES
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the high variability of the bid-ask spread itself). 
This assumption may on occasion lead to the 
overestimation of the risk.
Several studies show that such a correction leads, 
in some cases, to signiﬁ  cantly boosting the amount 
of VaR. Bangia et al. (1999) estimate for example 
that, in May 1997, liquidity risk accounted for 
over 17% of the market risk of a long position on 
USD/Thai Baht and for only 1.5% for positions 
on USD/Yen, the Yen/USD market being very 
liquid. Using a similar methodology for the stock 
market (CAC 40), Le Saout (2002) shows that the 
liquidity component may be substantial (up to 
52%) for certain securities. Looking at the Indian 
bond market, Roy (2005) ﬁ  nds that liquidity risk 
accounts for some 16% of the total risk on little 
traded securities.
The drawback of this methodology, however, is that 
it requires large samples of daily or even intra-day 
trading data, which are not always available.
Another option is to use the Roll (1984) measure, 
which seeks to provide an estimate of the implied 
spread using only observed market price series, 
under a number of assumptions (see Box 2).
This indicator may of course come in for criticism 
due to the underlying simplifying assumptions.
Stoll (1989) considers that it is liable to 
underestimate the effective spread because it 
neglects the effects of information asymmetry 
when evaluating transaction costs.15 Nevertheless, 
the Roll measure often provides relevant 
information on markets’ liquidity situation.16 
Chart  2 shows how close Roll’s coefﬁ  cient 
Box 1
Calculation of VaR adjusted for exogenous liquidity
according to the parametric method 
The parametric method for calculating VaR, applied to an asset, is based on the assumption of the normal distribution of 
returns of this asset. Let µ be the expected value of the distribution and σ its standard deviation.
The lowest return expected at date t, at a conﬁ  dence threshold of 99%, is:
 R t* = ln (P*t /Pt ) = µ - 2,33 σ (2)
where Pt is the asset price (midpoint) at t and P*t the worst price expected at a conﬁ  dence threshold of 99%. The coefﬁ  cient 
2.33 is the normal-law quantile at the conﬁ  dence threshold of 99%.
VaR at date t, measuring the highest potential loss at a conﬁ  dence threshold of 99% is by deﬁ  nition equal to Pt – P*t so 
that using (2):
  VaR = Pt (1- eµ -2,33 σ)  (3)
If we assume that the relative bid-ask spread is also taken from a normal distribution, the worst relative spread at the 
threshold of 99% is:
µ’ + 2,33 σ’
where µ’ is the expected relative spread and σ’ its standard deviation. The exogenous liquidity cost (ELC) at a one-day 
horizon is the worst half-spread at the threshold of 99%: 
  ELC = ½ Pt (µ’+ 2,33 σ’) (4)
Lastly, liquidity adjusted VaR (L-VaR) is:
  L-VaR = VaR + ELC = Pt (1- eµ -2,33 σ) + Pt /2 (µ’ + 2,33 σ’) (5)
15  See Huang and Stoll (1997) and Stoll (2000) for a review of bid-ask spread modelling and its breakdown into three types of factors: asymmetric information effects, 
inventory effects and order processing costs.
16  See Lesmond (2005), Upper (2000).ARTICLES
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(calculated for each day between 27 October 2005 
and 21 February 2006 on the basis of intra-day 
data) is to the half-spread actually quoted for a 
French share.17
The interest of using this measure as a tool for 
managing liquidity risk does not appear to have 
been considered hitherto. This is despite the fact 
that, in the absence of detailed databases, it can 
provide an indicative value of the bid-ask spread 
and be used to calculate an adjustment factor for 
VaR, for example as part of a historical simulation 
(see Box 3). This method for determining VaR 
adjusted for liquidity cost is recommended for 
its simplicity, because it does not require the 
formulation of assumptions on the probability 
distribution of returns or on that of Roll coefﬁ  cients. 
Table 1 in fact shows that the latter cannot be 
Box 2
The Roll measure as a proxy for the bid-ask spread
Let an asset whose observed price pt at t is assumed to reﬂ  ect the (unobservable) fundamental value mt of the asset, 
adjusted by a ﬁ  xed transaction cost between dates t-2 and t, be noted as c (half-spread):
 p t = mt + c qt (6)
with qt = +1 in the case of a purchase and -1 in the case of a sale.
The fundamental value mt of the asset is assumed to follow a constant variance random walk (as dictated by public 
announcements). The expected value of ∆pt is therefore zero: E(∆pt ) = 0. If it is assumed that buy and sell order ﬂ  ows 
are equiprobable at time t and that they are serially independent and do not depend on random public announcements, 
it may be shown that:
 E(∆pt.∆pt-1) = Cov (∆pt, ∆pt-1) = – c2 (7)
Therefore, the estimated half-spread c at date t is:
  c = – Cov(∆Pt , ∆Pt-1) √   si Cov (∆pt, ∆pt-1) ≤ 0 (8)
This measure is deﬁ  ned only if the co-variance between successive price changes is negative. To obtain a time series of 
Roll coefﬁ  cients, one must therefore neutralise the observations for which the co-variance is positive. Intuitively, the negative 
co-variance is due to the fact that there cannot be two successive price increases (decreases) in the absence of public 
announcements (i.e. in the absence of changes in fundamental value) and if the spread is ﬁ  xed; transactions therefore 
occur at the quoted bid or ask price.
considered here to be normally distributed, as the 
asymmetry coefﬁ  cient (skewness) is not zero and 
the kurtosis is (slightly) above 3. VaR calculations 
adjusted according to the historical simulation 
method will therefore consist in using the 
historical distribution of returns and the historical 
distribution of Roll coefﬁ  cients over the same 
period to estimate the distribution of possible losses
–including liquidity cost– on a current position.
Estimates of the bid-ask spread nonetheless indicate 
the cost of immediacy for limited value transactions, 
corresponding to market depth. Prices can therefore 
be considered as exogenous. However, the higher the 
transaction amount, the more important it is to take 
account of the risk that a negative price movement 
could result from these transactions (endogenous 
liquidity risk).
17  We randomly selected the Essilor share. Identical calculations were carried out for all the CAC 40 companies, which, in general, revealed that the Roll coefﬁ  cients 
were extremely close to the quoted half-spreads.ARTICLES
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Chart 2







Roll measure Quoted half-spread
15 Nov. 23 Dec. 27 Oct.
2005
4 Dec. 11 Janv.
2006
30 Janv. 18 Feb.
Source: Bloomberg; Banque de France calculations
Here, we have a sample of daily Roll coefﬁ  cients over 
four months only. For the sake of homogeneity, the series 
of daily returns on this share over the same period is used 
to calculate VaR adjusted for exogenous liquidity cost.
We apply the historical simulation method, i.e. we use 
the observed distribution of daily returns as well as 
that of Roll coefﬁ  cients between 27 October 2005 and 
21 February 2006.
At the threshold of 99%, the most negative rate of 
price change R* is around –2.2% and the highest Roll 
coefﬁ  cient EUR 0.067. As the mid-price (Pt) of the share 
was EUR 73.45 on 22 February 2006, the following 
results are obtained (for one share).
Box 3
Calculating adjusted VaR using the Roll measure as part of a historical simulation
Table 1









Calculations of VaR adjusted for the Essilor share
at a one-day horizon and at a threshold of 99%
Lowest expected price
P*= Pt  eR* 71.852
VaR = Pt – P* 1.598
Exogenous liquidity cost (ELC) 0.067
Adjusted VaR
LVaR = VaR + ELC 1.665
Share of ELC in adjusted VaR 4.02%
In this case, the exogenous liquidity risk (ELC) accounts 
for a fairly small proportion of the market risk of the 
Essilor share. This security therefore appears to have 
good liquidity on the calculation day (tightness of the 
spread). This evaluation however fails to cover the 
endogenous component of liquidity risk. Besides, the 
same type of calculation for other securities, outside 
the CAC 40 in particular, could yield signiﬁ  cantly less 
favourable results.
USING IMPACT MEASURES
Endogenous liquidity risk is the risk that the actual 
price of a transaction may be signiﬁ  cantly different 
from the price quoted just before the transaction 
was performed. This is also known as slippage.
It is therefore important to determine the relation 
that may exist between the size of an order and the 
price slippage that this order may cause, i.e. deﬁ  ne 
an impact measure (function).18
One may therefore seek to estimate a coefﬁ  cient 
representing market depth, such as Kyle’s λ
or  variants of it.19 It must be noted that, in
equation (1), the coefﬁ  cient λ relates to sales as 
well as purchases, which means that the impact of 
18  It must be pointed out that these impact measures may be high (in other words, asset prices may vary considerably even though turnover is low) without being 
inﬂ  uenced by market depth or liquidity: for example when a public announcement leads to a price revision. Nonetheless, for long series, it is rare for major price 
adjustments to occur without corresponding transaction ﬂ  ows.
19 Kyle’s  coefﬁ  cient is a frequently used indicator in studies on market microstructure. Pastor and Stambaugh’s measure (2003) is close to this, the idea being that the 
reversal in the sign of returns following the trading of large volumes is more pronounced in less liquid markets.ARTICLES
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purchases and sales is assumed to be symmetrical. 
This simplifying assumption may be removed
by estimating, for example, an econometric 
equation of the following type:
  ∆Pt = α + λ1 VOLP,t + λ2 VOLS,t + εt (9)
where VOLP,t and VOLS,t respectively represent the 
volume of buy orders and the volume of sell orders 
over the period t, with λ1 being the coefﬁ  cient of 
the impact of purchases and λ2 that of the impact 
of sales. In formulae (1) or (9), the term ∆ Pt 
corresponds to the absolute (or relative) change in 
the mid-price after a transaction.20
If one sticks to equation (1), estimating coefﬁ  cient 
λ at a given time requires the use of a sample of 
intra-day data on bid-ask prices, actual transaction 
prices and trading volumes. The procedure 
is as follows: based on intra-day data, to each 
transaction is attributed the midpoint price that 
precedes it by at least ﬁ  ve seconds, allowing 
time for quotation changes. For the net volume 
of orders (NVOL), orders are classiﬁ  ed between 
those initiated by buyers and those initiated 
by sellers. Following Lee and Ready (1991),
transactions performed at a price above the 
midpoint are classiﬁ  ed as “buy” transactions and 
those conducted at a price below the midpoint 
are classiﬁ  ed as “sell” transactions.
Re-estimating equation (9) by linear regression 
at each date t using these data thus provides 
a time series of impact coefﬁ  cients. Lastly, a 
corrective factor for VaR that takes account of 
endogenous liquidity risk must be deduced from 
the estimated coefﬁ  cients. To do so, an historical 
simulation may be carried out. In the case of a 
sale, a discount determined by the coefﬁ  cient λ 
of the day is subtracted from the mid-price. Both 
components of liquidity risk (endogenous and 
exogenous) may in fact be incorporated into the 
calculation in the process.
This methodology is also quite demanding in terms 
of data availability. A strategy that is easier to 
implement might be to start directly from restrictive 
(pessimistic)  assumptions on the price-elasticity of 
demand and supply, in order to estimate the potential 
costs arising from the liquidation of a portfolio in a 
shallow market.
Assuming ﬁ  rstly, market demand that is quite 
inelastic in the short term, so that daily transaction 
value is assumed to be ﬁ  xed (equal to that observed 
on the calculation day), and secondly, inelastic 
supply (meaning that the seller accepts any price 
imposed by market demand, provided that its 
order is fully executed) leads us to form fairly 
pessimistic expectations of market liquidity: the 
absorption of an excess supply of securities leads 
solely to a drop in the average ask price (absence 
of quantity effect, i.e. of adjustment of the quantity 
demanded to supply). Therefore, if V is the daily 
trading value of a certain category of securities 
(assumed to be ﬁ  xed), N the number of stocks 
traded daily (assumed to be known), P the average 
price of the stock before the transaction (P = V/N),
the excess supply ∆N pushes the average price 
from P to P’ = V / N+∆N. The rate of change in the 
price resulting from the liquidation of ∆N stocks 
is therefore:
  ∆ P/P = - ∆N/N (10)
Equation (10) thus makes it possible to adjust the 
historical returns observed for an impact factor 
 λ ’ = ∆P / P
∆N / N  linked to the size of the portfolio 
to be liquidated, and to calculate adjusted VaR 
using a historical simulation. This approach is 
doubly interesting. First because it is based on 
conservative assumptions, which are appropriate 
in a risk-control perspective, and second because 
it uses data available for a large number of 
stock markets (average daily transaction value 
and average number of stocks traded daily).
D. Cosandey (2001) illustrates this approach by 
considering the liquidation of equity portfolios.
The same concern about data availability may 
justify recourse to more general indicators, such as 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, which may be 
calculated on the basis of daily transaction prices 
20  It is possible to select changes in actual transaction prices as a dependent variable, but it may be preferable to use the mid-price because it can change in the absence 
of transactions, unlike the transaction price. Using the transaction price could lead to underestimating the impact of a sale. Besides, equation (9), like equation (1), 
assumes the stationarity of variables at play or the existence of a cointegration relation between these variables.ARTICLES
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and volumes. For a given asset class, the average 
illiquidity ratio in the month t is deﬁ  ned by:
Dt
γ





with  rd,t being the return on the asset vd,t  the 
volume of the asset traded (in currency units) on 
day d, during the month t, and Dt the number of 
observations in the course of the month t. To obtain 
a daily assessment, the following expression is 
considered:
γ
d = lnPd – lnPd-1
vd
where Pd is the price observed on day d, and vd 
the turnover on day d. The γd coefﬁ  cient may be 
considered as the equivalent of Kyle’s λ estimated 
at low frequency. As a general indicator, it applies 
symmetrically to purchases and sales. No distinction 
is made here between fundamental factors and 
liquidity problems in price changes. In a study of the 
US stock market, Hasbrouck (2005) however ﬁ  nds 
that the Amihud ratio is the best indicator based on 
daily data of the impact of volumes on prices. The 
γd coefﬁ  cient may therefore replace Kyle’s λ in the 
calculation of adjusted VaR. 
It must here again be emphasised that liquidity risk 
estimates are often hampered by a lack of data: for 
example, the trading volumes required to calculate 
the Amihud ratio are rarely available on the foreign 
exchange markets. In addition, there is a lack of 
directly usable market data for certain little traded 
derivatives. Pricing these instruments therefore 
means using valuation models and the issue of 
liquidity risk assessment therefore becomes part of 
the larger problem of model risk (see below).
Moreover, a more in-depth analysis of impact 
functions would in fact require more sophisticated 
modelling than that derived from Kyle’s model. 
Thus, the dynamic properties of prices would be 
better captured by introducing lagged variables 
into the impact function. Similarly, the linear 
speciﬁ  cation of the impact function may be called 
into question, as the liquidity premium (or discount) 
demanded by the market for the execution of orders 
is probably not strictly proportional to their size.21 
In addition, we have hitherto considered a stable 
relationship between turnover and price changes. 
Another methodological approach would be to 
consider that price elasticity is random in nature 
due to the impact of unpredictable factors, other 
than order size, on price changes. Some recent 
theoretical studies thus attempt to directly model 
the reaction function of the market to volumes as a 
stochastic process,22 but the possibilities of practical 
implementation with respect to risk management 
remain uncertain.
Lastly, we made the implicit assumption of a 
block and instantaneous liquidation of a position 
to measure its incidence on prices. However, the 
market impact differs depending on the duration 
of the liquidation. An element that is decisive 
for the impact on prices is in fact the liquidation 
rate: the aggressive liquidation of a position may 
provoke a powerful negative reaction from the 
market. Conversely, chopping transactions up into 
small-sized orders that are presented on the market 
progressively may, in theory, signiﬁ  cantly reduce 
liquidity costs. Nonetheless, slower liquidation 
generates higher opportunity costs and exposes 
the position to price volatility (price risk) over a 
protracted period. There is therefore a trade-off 
between the risk of price change and endogenous 
liquidity risk, with the optimal liquidation strategy 
making it possible to partially control the impact 
on prices by choosing the amount to be liquidated 
periodically or the time frame for liquidation.23 
The assumption of immediate liquidation is in fact 
justiﬁ  ed in crisis situations when investors cannot 
choose their liquidation strategy, but are subject to 
panic (see below).
The spread and elasticity measures suggested, 
based on past observations, are supposed to provide 
relevant information for “average” situations and 
fall smoothly within the framework of the VaR 
model. They therefore appear to be useful for the 
management of normal liquidity risk.
However, market liquidity may undergo violent 
upheavals. The impact of collective liquidation in times 
of stress is not covered by measures of endogenous 
21  See Almgren and Chriss (2003).
22  See Jarrow and Protter (2005), Çetin et al. (2004).
23  On optimal liquidation models, see Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Almgren and Chriss (2000), Berkowitz (2000), Subramanian and Jarrow (2001).ARTICLES
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risk –which concern the liquidation of individual 
positions– and even less so by the measures of 
exogenous risk considered above. This underlines 
the difﬁ   culty for market participants to protect 
themselves from a risk that is systemic in nature.
2|2  Capturing extreme liquidity risk 
A general liquidity crisis is an extreme event: it 
occurs infrequently but its consequences may 
be very costly. The singularity of such events 
calls for appropriate risk management tools. The 
extreme value theory and stress tests may help 
to prevent these types of events. More generally, 
the fundamental uncertainty surrounding market 
liquidity, in particular in periods of turmoil, calls 
for a precautionary approach and the consideration 
of the model risk that affects the various indicators 
of liquidity risk.
EXTREME VALUE THEORY AND MANAGEMENT
OF LIQUIDITY CRISIS RISK 
Beyond the limitations stemming from the fact that 
they do not cover transaction costs in normal times, 
conventional VaR calculation methods appear to be 
poorly adapted to the capture of liquidity crises, 
which are extreme events. The historical simulation 
is in fact liable to be based on a sample of data that is 
too narrow to take account of the worst eventualities, 
while the parametric method is based on the use 
of normal distributions that tend to underestimate 
the distribution tails of losses.24 Nonetheless, it is 
in fact these tails that must be properly assessed in 
ﬁ  nancial risk management.
The extreme value theory provides theoretical results 
on the limit (asymptotic) probability distribution 
of extreme losses and it does so without having to 
formulate strong assumptions on the form of the 
underlying distribution of returns. The principle 
consists in extrapolating the behaviour of possible 
extreme values based on the sample of the greatest 
losses actually observed. 
From a practical perspective, i.e. for the calculation 
of the parameters of the asymptotic distribution, we 
therefore do not use a complete series of returns and 
losses, but only the series of maximum losses (the 
sharpest drops in prices). Two approaches are used 
to construct this sub-sample:
•  the block maxima method, which consists in 
breaking the historical observation period into data 
“blocks” of equal length (e.g. monthly, quarterly or 
half-yearly blocks) which are divided into n time 
periods, and using only the upper bound of each 
block. When n becomes very large, the maxima 
follow a “generalised extreme value distribution”.
• The peaks over threshold method, which is based 
on the analysis of losses exceeding a high threshold 
u to be deﬁ  ned. When u becomes very large, the 
losses exceeding the value u follow a “generalised 
Pareto distribution”.
Each of these methods therefore shows a limit 
probability distribution whose parameters are 
estimated using the sub-sample of extreme values. 
This distribution may then be used to assess 
exceptional risks.25
To apply extreme value theory to liquidity crisis 
risk one must therefore, ideally, have long series 
of indicators on average liquidity risk. For example, 
where one is fortunate enough to have a signiﬁ  cant 
sample of bid-ask spreads for a ﬁ  nancial product, 
one must extract from this series the widest 
spreads in order to determine their distribution 
and calculate the corresponding VaR adjusted for 
extreme liquidity cost. This also holds for indicators 
of endogenous risk.26
Another way of proceeding, which is justiﬁ  ed by 
the interdependence of risks during major crises 
–in particular between price risk and liquidity risk–   
would be to directly calculate an extreme VaR, while 
considering that the market data that were used to 
construct this VaR model provide information on 
the risks of price changes as well as the risks of loss 
arising from the evaporation of liquidity. While this 
24  This is why even CVaR (Conditional VaR) or Expected Shortfall, which corresponds to the average amount of losses exceeding a predeﬁ  ned amount of VaR and 
which therefore concerns possible extreme losses, is liable to underestimate the real distribution of extreme losses so long as it is calculated –like the VaR on which 
it is based– on the basis of a normal distribution.
25  On extreme value theory, see Embrechts et al. (1997).
26  It must be noted that the extreme value method is a semi-parametric method for assessing risk, for it is based on the explicit formulation of a probability distribution. 
Some studies use a more empirical approach, by determining a corrective factor for non-normality based on the historical distribution of the spread. See Bangia
et al. (1999) and Le Saout (2002).ARTICLES
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method is simpler, it is probably less precise because 
it does not model the determinants of liquidity.
Extreme value theory is an attractive approach for 
assessing extreme illiquidity risks that is grounded 
on clear foundations. Nevertheless, as an asymptotic 
theory, it requires sufﬁ  ciently long observation 
series, which could pose problems, especially when 
the markets are not very mature. It is also difﬁ  cult 
to implement in its multivariate version when 
too many risk factors are taken into account. This 
highlights the limits of a strictly statistical approach 
to liquidity crisis risk.
LIQUIDITY STRESS TESTS
The difﬁ  culty of applying extreme value theory in 
the face of the complex chain of events that is set 
in train during crises may lead to a preference for 
other approaches based on simulation, i.e. stress 
tests. The Basel Committee moreover acknowledges 
stress tests to be an integral element of the internal 
control of market risks.27
Stress tests encompass various practices 
(scenarios, sensitivity analyses) that aim to assess 
the consequences of infrequent but plausible
large-scale shocks on the value of a portfolio.
Stress tests therefore presuppose ﬁ  rst, the deﬁ  nition 
of the relevant market movements and second,
the quantiﬁ  cation of their impact on the value of 
the portfolio. Following the Asian crisis of 1997 
and the events of autumn 1998, the large ﬁ  nancial 
institutions improved their ability to conduct
such tests.28
From the perspective of extreme liquidity risk, stress 
tests make it possible to assess the implications of 
certain phenomena that characterise crisis episodes: 
unusual increase in the correlation of risks, atypical 
rise in volatility or even the inability to trade on 
certain market segments. They therefore enable 
the detection of complex risks that are difﬁ  cult to 
capture using a probabilistic approach.
Liquidity crisis is not only an extreme event, it is 
also a collective phenomenon that develops and 
fuels itself in an endogenous manner on the spread 
of liquidity fears. It is therefore crucial to examine 
the factors that may lead to such one-way market 
movements. One of these factors is the practice of 
stop-loss rules, i.e. the mechanical triggering of a sell 
order when the market price overshoots a predeﬁ  ned 
threshold, another is dynamic hedging, which leads 
net issuers of put options to liquidate the underlying 
securities for hedging purposes when the prices of 
these securities drop sharply and a large majority of 
option holders seek to exercise their options. These 
waves of mechanical selling on bearish markets are 
instrumental in the spread of liquidity problems. 
More generally, an institution’s crises scenarios 
must, as much as possible, incorporate the fragility of 
its entire balance sheet, i.e. the possible mismatches 
between illiquid investments on the assets side 
and precarious sources of ﬁ  nance on the liabilities 
side. For example, the difﬁ   culties of meeting 
margin calls on collateralised loans or uncertainty 
surrounding borrowing capacity may herald more 
major difﬁ  culties when they lead to the unwinding 
of positions under stress.
An especially edifying stress test for a large 
institution would be to envisage the consequences 
of the simultaneous withdrawal of its counterparties 
from the market. This was in fact the path taken by 
JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank in the aftermath of 
the near bankruptcy of LTCM. Aware of the potential 
dangers arising from the high concentration of 
certain markets (interest rate options and credit 
derivatives), the two banks developed “dealer exit 
stress tests” aimed at estimating the risks of a sudden 
drying up of market liquidity generated by one or 
several of their counterparties.29 In this regard, it 
is important for institutions to consider liquidity 
conditions from a systemic angle by paying particular 
attention not only to the possible impacts of the 
concentration of the positions of their counterparties 
and other market participants, but also to their own 
impact on the markets when they account for a 
substantial fraction of these markets. 
Besides the problems relating to the relevance of the 
scenarios chosen, the implementation costs and the 
low frequency of stress tests, one of the essential 
difﬁ  culties of stress tests remains endowing the 
scenarios envisaged with a degree of plausibility. 
This intrinsic limitation of risk measurement, 
27  See the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks.
28  See CGFS (2000) and (2001).
29  See Jeffery (2003).ARTICLES
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particularly for very rare and systemically important 
events, highlights the importance of experience and 
good judgement in the analysis of the potential scale 
of liquidity risk.
MODEL UNCERTAINTY
AND THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH
Indeed, in liquidity risk management, the 
problem of measurement is closely linked to that 
of decision-making under uncertainty. Faced with 
the uncertainty that surrounds future liquidity 
conditions, and consequently measures of 
illiquidity risk, forecasting appears in fact to be a 
delicate or even insurmountable task, especially 
for major phases of stress. This in no way signiﬁ  es
that all efforts of quantiﬁ   cation must be
abandoned. It instead requires the adoption of a 
precautionary attitude in the face of the inaccuracy 
of the risk indicators.
One must therefore acknowledge the shortcomings 
that at times result from the lack of information 
and the complexity of the interactions, and 
appreciate that the models designed to assess 
risks may be subject to uncertainty. This is 
particularly clear for the valuation of little traded 
derivatives, whose pricing is based exclusively 
on the construction of models.30 Two main types 
of errors may, in general, compromise a model’s 
reliability: errors concerning parameters and 
errors of speciﬁ  cation. In any case, the most 
harmful attitude in practice would be to place 
one’s trust in biased indicators tending towards 
the underestimation of liquidity problems.
Taking into account the risk linked to model 
uncertainty and the precautionary principle therefore 
leads to the consideration, around a reference model, 
of a set of possible alternative models and the choice 
in the risk assessment process, of the model that 
yields the greatest losses. This conservative strategy, 
which it seems appropriate to use when it is not 
possible to rely on conventional statistical inference 
procedures, refers back to a type of uncertainty 
that cannot be perfectly measured in terms of 
probabilities and which affects the liquidation value 
of an asset in certain critical situations. This strategy 
may in fact be transposed into mathematical terms 
and yield quantiﬁ  ed operational results. 
In the probabilistic context of the extreme values 
theory, it has been suggested that the calculation 
of an extreme VaR model encompassing market 
risk and liquidity risk may be a way of factoring in 
extreme liquidity risk. Similarly, the determination 
of a sufﬁ   ciently robust adjusted VaR measure
could play this role in a context of strong uncertainty. 
In this regard, Rey et al. (2004) provide an interesting 
illustration. The authors develop a calculation of 
VaR by linking each possible loss not to a point 
probability, but to an interval of probabilities, whose 
width is dependent on a parameter that represents 
perceived uncertainty. By setting the value of this 
parameter at a level that is sufﬁ  ciently high, in 
accordance with the precautionary principle, the 
aim is to capture the highest liquidity risk within 
certain bounds of plausibility. Recognising the 
incomplete nature of the information available and 
the limited capacity to process this information 
should in fact be an integral part of all liquidity risk 
control strategies.
30 See  Cont  (2004).ARTICLES
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31  The Counterparty Risk Policy Management Group II, chaired by Corrigan (E. G.). See the group’s report, “Toward greater ﬁ  nancial stability: A private sector 
perspective” published in July 2005.
The international ﬁ  nancial community currently appears to have a better grasp of the risks associated with liquidity illusion. 
A working group made up of large private ﬁ  nancial institutions31 recently focused on the initiatives that need to be taken by 
private players in their risk management procedures in order to bolster the stability and efﬁ  ciency of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
The report resulting from this work especially underlines the need for ﬁ  nancial institutions to strengthen their capacity to 
assess the possible threat of crowded trades, which means that they need to re-appraise their usual risk measures and 
enhance their stress tests.
To this end, this article has attempted to clarify the different aspects of illiquidity risk and explore a few avenues for 
incorporating this risk into the existing risk control tools. Two main conclusions may be drawn.
• There is a productive convergence between research on ﬁ  nancial market microstructure and risk management practices. 
This convergence should make it possible to construct and track relevant indicators of market liquidity risk.
• It is essential to make a distinction between normal times and times of stress. This distinction calls not only for the 
development of separate methodologies, of which we have provided a few examples, but also for the combination of these 
different methods in a comprehensive risk approach.
Overall, the construction of appropriate models that help ﬁ  nancial institutions to better evaluate their risk exposure must be 
encouraged as an element of market self-discipline. However, liquidity risk management cannot of course be reduced to 
the search for quantitative indicators: experience and good judgement are crucial in this area, particularly for coping with 
periods of stress when market behaviour sometimes diverges from conventional models.
In addition, it must be borne in mind that from a macroeconomic point of view, market liquidity is the product of externalities 
generated by all market participants, which agree to act as counterparties in sale/purchase transactions and by so doing 
perform a market making function. Even though ﬁ  nancial institutions may be aware of the collective nature of liquidity, there 
is little likelihood of them being able to make the most of this: ﬁ  rst because their information on the scale and overlapping of 
risks is necessarily limited; second because they have no incentive, from the point of view of individual rationality, to shore up 
market liquidity when it is ﬂ  oundering. It is therefore a major stake and clearly a matter of concern for public authorities.
Communication between markets and authorities is at the heart of the prevention of generalised illiquidity risk. This is why 
it is necessary not only to encourage information transparency between market participants (for example between hedge 
funds and their counterparties) so that they can build appropriate tools for managing liquidity risk, but also for supervisors 
to have better means of assessing such risks at the ﬁ  nancial system level, and transfer, if need be, the results of this 
assessment to the markets. From this point of view, the performance of aggregate stress tests could assist in the quantitative 
assessment of the ﬁ  nancial system’s resilience to liquidity shocks. These stress tests should incorporate participants’ size 
and level of leverage, identify their sources of ﬁ  nance and more generally take account of the multiple interdependence 
networks between counterparties. Similarly, the development of regular indicators for monitoring market liquidity would be 
useful to public authorities in the carrying out of their ﬁ  nancial stability tasks.ARTICLES
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